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Abstract
This paper is about dialogic listening as a 
precondition for meaningful engagement in 
Socratic dialogues and for music. In order 
to arrive at a better understanding of what 
constitutes dialogic listening in the context of 
educational philosophical dialogues, I first shed 
light on the practice of philosophy teaching based 
on Nelson & Heckmann’s neo-Socratic paradigm 
and link this practice to Plato’s dialogues. I 
then argue that the activity of listening to an 
interlocutor during Socratic dialogues on the one 
hand, and listening to music on the other, may in 
both cases be understood as a precondition for 
the process of engagement and, consequently, 
the co-creation of meaning as a central objective 
to the philosophical practice. I show this by 
discussing both Buber and Gadamer, combining 
their insights into three interrelated features of 
dialogic listening: 1) openness, 2) reciprocity, and 
3) awareness, which apply to both philosophical 
dialogues and music. Ultimately, I attempt to 
make a case for the complementary application of 
music in the philosophical educational practice.
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Escucha dialógica: cómo la música nos puede 
ayudar a ser mejores filósofos
Resumen
En este artículo se habla acerca de la escucha dialógica como requisito tanto 
para la participación significativa en los diálogos socráticos educativos 
como para la música. Con el fin de entender mejor la definición de escucha 
dialógica en los diálogos filosóficos educativos, hablo sobre la práctica de 
la enseñanza de filosofía basada en el paradigma neosocrático de Nelson 
y Heckmann y la relaciono con los diálogos de Platón. Luego, planteo que 
escuchar a un interlocutor durante diálogos socráticos y escuchar música 
pueden ser un requisito para el involucramiento y, en consecuencia, para la 
co-creación de sentido como objetivo central de la práctica filosófica. Para 
tal fin, recurro a Buber y Gadamer y combino sus puntos de vista en tres 
elementos de la escucha dialógica que se interrelacionan: 1) apertura, 2) 
reciprocidad y 3) conciencia del otro, los cuales aplican tanto a los diálogos 
filosóficos como a la música. Por último, defiendo el uso complementario 
de la música en la práctica educativa de la filosofía.
Palabras clave: escuchar, diálogo, música, filosofía, educación
I’écoute dialogique : comment la musique peut 
nous aider à être de meilleurs philosophes
Résumé
Dans cet article, je parle de l’écoute dialogique en tant que condition aussi 
bien pour la participation significative aux dialogues socratiques dans 
le milieu éducatif que pour la musique. Afin de mieux comprendre la 
définition d’écoute dialogique dans les dialogues philosophiques éducatifs, 
je m’adresse sur la pratique de l’enseignement de la philosophie fondée 
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sur le paradigme néo-socratique de Nelson et Heckmann et je fais un 
rapprochement avec les dialogues de Platon. Ensuite, j’affirme que le fait 
d’écouter un interlocuteur lors des dialogues socratiques et le fait d’écouter 
de la musique pourraient être une condition pour participer et, par 
conséquent, pour co-créer du sens comme l’objectif principal de la pratique 
philosophique. Dans ce but, je m’appuie sur les points de vue de Buber et 
Gadamer, en les combinant avec trois éléments de l’écoute dialogique qui 
sont interconnectés : 1) ouverture, 2) réciprocité, et 3) conscience d’autrui ; 
lesquels peuvent être appliqués aussi bien aux dialogues philosophiques 
qu’à la musique. Enfin, je défends l’usage complémentaire de la musique 
dans la pratique éducative de la philosophie.
Mots-clés : l’écoute, le dialogue, la musique, la philosophie, l’éducation
Escuta dialógica: como a música pode nos 
ajudar a ser melhores filósofos
Resumo
Neste artigo, falo sobre a escuta dialógica como requisito tanto para 
a participação significativa nos diálogos socráticos educativos e como 
para a música. Para entender melhor a definição de escuta dialógica nos 
diálogos filosóficos educativos, falo sobre a prática do ensino da filosofia 
baseada no paradigma neo-socrático de Nelson e Heckmann e a relaciono 
com os diálogos de Platão. Logo proponho que escutar um interlocutor 
durante os diálogos socráticos e escutar música podem ser um requisito 
para o envolvimento e, em consequência, para a co-criação de sentido 
como objetivo central da prática filosófica. Para esse fim, recorro a Buber 
e Gadamer, combinando seus pontos de vista em três elementos de escuta 
dialógica que se inter-relacionam: 1) atitude aberta, 2) reciprocidade e 3) 
consciência do outro; os quais se aplicam tanto aos diálogos filosóficos 
como à música. Finalmente, defendo o uso complementário da música na 
prática educativa da filosofia. 
Palavras-chave: ouvir, dialogar, música, filosofia, educação
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Introduction: Plato and the neo-Socratic 
paradigm 
As one of the founding figures of Socratic education, Leonard Nelson 
(1882-1927) put it: “the Socratic method is the art of teaching 
not philosophy but philosophizing, the art not of teaching about 
philosophers but of making philosophers of the students” (Nelson, 
1949, p. 18). This seems to make sense: teaching primary school 
children about philosophers and their theories is not likely to be very 
fruitful just yet. Philosophizing as a practice, however, is something 
that aligns much more with the natural inquisitiveness of primary 
school children. After all, what is practiced is wondering about the 
world by cooperatively reflecting on philosophical issues. Indeed, 
“wonder is the only beginning of philosophy” (Plato, Theaetetus, 
section 155d; Schinkel 2017, 2018). 
The Socratic practice as fostered by Nelson & Heckmann, also 
referred to as the neo-Socratic paradigm, offers a way to philosophize. 
Although this practice presupposes and promotes certain crafts, 
it is not a technique. Rather, it implies an attentive and thorough 
investigation of thoughts, attitudes and behaviours, and departs from 
an intention to collaborate philosophically. (Raupach-Strey, 2012)
The case of Plato’s famous dialogue Menon and the comparison 
between Socrates and a torpedo fish, which numbs anything it 
touches, serves as a good example of the process of co-creating 
meaning, inherent to the educational practice. Socrates responds to 
Menon’s allegation as follows:
As for me, if the torpedo is torpid itself while causing others to 
be torpid, I am like it, but not otherwise. For it is not from any 
sureness in myself that I cause others to doubt: it is from being 
in more doubt than anyone else that I cause doubt in others. So 
now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, though 
perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with 
me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But nonetheless I am 
willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature. 
(Plato, Menon, section 80a-d)
Especially this willingness to cooperate—presupposed in the 
notion of dialogue—instead of lecturing, is what makes Socrates one 
of the prime embodiments of the dialogic philosophical practice in 
today’s educational contexts. 
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As the name suggests, the neo-Socratic paradigm is heavily 
influenced by Plato’s dialogues. Yet, in ancient Greece and in the 
Middle Ages, dialogue primarily refers to a literary form: instead 
of a meeting of subjective perspectives that evolve. Why then the 
term neo-Socratic, one may wonder? To address this, I will point 
out some important resemblances and differences between Plato’s 
work and Socratic education. 
When it comes to the antique Socratic dialogue as popularized 
by Plato, dialogue is a written account and therefore, a form of art 
that describes a discursive meeting between two or more persons 
who, in most cases, collaboratively and critically reason about 
a given subject or philosophical problem in order to arrive at a 
universal truth—e.g. the Symposium—or a righteous conclusion—
e.g. Euthyphro—(Raupach-Strey, 2012).
The foundation of this inquiry is reason, according to Raupach-
Strey (2012) negatively delineated in Plato’s dialogues as follows: 
1. One should not follow opinions of the general people. If needed, 
only the opinions of experts.
2. One should not follow one’s own emotions.
3. One should not consider the potential negative consequences 
for oneself to be a decisive factor. 
Whoever follows the principle of Logos—i.e. understanding—as 
opposed to the rhetorical method or tricks of the sophists, attempts 
to arrive at a truth that reasonably follows from one’s own insight. 
This is famously referred to as the maieutic approach in Theaitetos, 
where Socrates states that he is the son of a midwife—phaenarete—
and explains why he practices the same profession, only as a 
philosophical variant. 
In addition, it is historically known that Socrates is a person 
who converses with everybody, making dialogue the most natural 
form to his character. Platonic dialogue as a quest for insight is a 
way of collaboratively practicing philosophy by means of critically 
questioning and answering. During this process of questioning 
and answering, ideas are tested from different perspectives and 
attempted to be refuted. (Sluiter, 2014)
Furthermore, dialogue in Plato’s tradition embodies a certain 
didactic process from the perspective of both the teacher and the 
pupil. Strictly speaking, both participants of the dialogue depart 
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from the idea of equality, whereby every step is taken in agreement. 
In practice, however, the teacher—Socrates—usually asks the 
questions and the pupil—his interlocutor—is the one who answers. 
The learning process of the pupil is tied to the idea that our soul 
has knowledge from before our birth; knowledge that has been 
temporarily forgotten as a result of the traumatic event of birth. In 
a sense then, the learning process revolves around remembering—
anamnesis—what one already knows with help of the teacher who 
asks questions. 
Critically important to educational contexts, is the fact that 
Plato’s dialogues embody a normative idea of philosophy as an act 
that requires to be practiced socially. Sometimes, especially when 
Socrates speaks to certain sophists, he repeatedly insists that they 
should refrain from engaging in long monologues, and encourages 
them to go along with his question-answer model. When this fails, 
however, Socrates will eventually hold a monologue himself. In such 
cases, he poses a question and answers it as well (e.g. Gorgias)—a 
strategy that is generally avoided in today’s philosophical educational 
practices, because it prevents the participants to philosophize 
themselves. 
In other occasions, Plato’s dialogue ends up not being a dialogue 
at all but instead a narration, as in the case of the Phaedo. Finally, 
it can be generally said that Socrates assumes a certain direction in 
his style of questioning. Answers to his questions are often in the 
form of “yes,” “indeed,” or “exactly!” This is very important to the 
dialogic process, as one has to agree on a certain conception to be 
able to advance together (Raupach-Strey, 2012). What one learns 
from a Socratic dialogue would not be possible without the idea of a 
collective effort driven by rational deliberation, where agreement of 
all parties is sought with respect to what stands up to the objections 
raised, and what does not. 
It is in this sense that Socratic dialogue in the neo-Socratic 
paradigm strives for consensus. This consensus presupposes 
reasonable equivalence among the participants and equality of 
treatment by the moderator. When it comes to consensus it is 
important to note that it is not the same as reaching a compromise; 
the idea of seeking consensus serves as a motivation to expose 
objections—however absurd they may seem—to serious scrutiny in 
pursuit of new insight. (Raupach-Strey, 2012)
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Often, consensus is seen as a way of compromising, as if 
participating in a dialogue presupposes antagonizing others. From 
this perspective, consensus assumes disagreement, friction and 
quarrel, that should be transcended by striving for consensus. The 
question is whether this consensus is justly presupposed. Perhaps 
it is not necessary at all to strive for consensus in this sense, since 
the dialogue does not typically depart from this presupposition of 
disagreement. It starts from the shared Socratic “I know that I don’t 
know” disposition—a disposition that already presupposes a certain 
consensus. 
Another objection to the idea of consensus is that it presupposes 
an irrefutable idea as outcome, that can only count on consensus 
of participants because it is true. Realistically, this is hardly ever 
achieved. But what is more important about this presupposition is 
that it allows for equality of the participants as reasonable beings. 
Consensus, however, is not necessarily a goal in itself, it is a 
consequence of accepting the idea that there is a certain truth that 
all can equally access with the help of reason. The question is not so 
much whether there is one truth or not, it is the practical implication 
of the presupposition that matters. 
Therefore, it can be said that one who only participates in 
a dialogue to develop one’s own thoughts and insights, and is 
not concerned at all with collaboratively investigating a certain 
philosophical issue from the premise that we are all living beings 
with experiences and thoughts about the subject in question, is not 
really engaging in a philosophical dialogue. Consensus is important 
in as far as this togetherness is important; on the one hand 
consensus is something that we strive for as an outcome, on the 
other, consensus is what makes collaborative effort possible. Seen 
from this perspective, consensus is a kind of shared responsibility 
that all participants carry in order to facilitate the dialogic process.
The neo-Socratic tradition after Nelson & Heckmann has 
much in common with the antique form of dialogue but there are 
important differences as well. First of all, the foundation for a theory 
of knowledge, as well as the conditions for it to develop, are different. 
Plato’s Socrates held a different perspective on the possibility for 
objective and universal truth than Nelson did, who stood in a neo-
Kantian tradition that problematized this perspective by offering a 
representationalist framework from which to think about the world. 
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Another difference is found in the number of participants. In 
contrast to Socrates, who would usually have one interlocutor, the 
neo-Socratic paradigm allows for larger groups to take part in the 
dialogue. In the antique form and in addition to taking a leading 
position by determining the course of the dialogue with questions 
and other contributions, it was Socrates who would usually speak 
most of the time. In the new paradigm, however, the facilitator of 
the dialogue has a facilitating role and is required to stay on the 
background as much as possible. She takes responsibility for the 
understanding of the participants and lays out or explains the 
procedure of the dialogue. The other participants are equal in their 
role as speakers, and together they take part in the dialogic process. 
(Raupach-Strey, 2012)
Speaking and listening 
So far, it may seem that speaking is at the heart of Socratic dialogue. 
Contrary to what one may assume, however, I will argue that a Socratic 
dialogue typically starts with listening rather than speaking. This 
seems even true for Plato’s dialogues. After all, Socrates is only able 
to point out illogical reasoning or false truths by carefully listening 
and subsequently responding on the basis of what his interlocutors 
are saying. Indeed, this principle is central to educational Socratic 
dialogues as well, since the main focus is on discourse, reflection, 
and deliberating competing ideas as opposed to a way of recitation, 
where teachers do most of the talking and limit themselves to asking 
closed questions—better known as the initiation–reply–evaluation 
[IRE] structure. (Mehan & Cazden, 2015) 
It is worth noting that Socratic dialogue clearly presupposes 
listening, yet, despite the apparent importance of listening, there is 
little research about its exact role and importance for educational 
contexts. Conversely, the importance of dialogue in education 
is often emphasized in debates and reports about our education 
system. Terms such as 21st century skills and democratic citizenship 
presuppose dialogic practices (Thijs, Fisser, & Hoeven, 2014; 
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2017) Moreover, 
classroom dialogue is often seen as of intrinsic educational 
importance (Veen, Kruistum, & Michaels, 2015; Veen, Mey, 
Kruistum, & Oers, 2017). Strikingly, however, our understanding 
of Socratic education is still rather limited, resulting in a bias that 
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philosophical dialogue is mainly about speaking, sharing opinions, 
or debating others. (Fiumara, 1990) 
To arrive at a more balanced understanding of what exactly 
philosophical education is calling for, this paper conceptualizes 
dialogic listening as an undervalued yet critically important virtue, 
relevant to all participants of the Socratic dialogue. In addition, I 
understand dialogic listening as a key skill needed to attain quality 
and depth in educational philosophical dialogues in primary school 
classrooms, that may be improved with the help of music. 
Finally, listening well to each other is not only essential to the 
quality and depth of the philosophical dialogue but for inclusive 
education too (Kim, 2016). Although not directly the subject of this 
paper, dialogic listening may also serve as an antidote to increasing 
threats of cultural polarization and political intolerance. 
The Socratic dialogue and the role of listening
In arriving at the pedagogical principles for his method, Nelson 
studies both Socrates’ virtues and his mistakes. One of the most 
important lessons he takes from Socrates is locating the “art of 
forcing minds to freedom” (Nelson, 1949, p. 29)—where freedom 
refers to liberating one’s own thinking from any kind of dogmatism. 
To allow his pupils to do their own thinking, this also applies to the 
facilitator of the dialogue. After all, offering ready-made judgments or 
expert opinions systematically obstructs the philosophical endeavour 
as conceptualized by Nelson, and later, by his student Gustav 
Heckmann (1993). This principle also applies to the ways in which 
philosophical dialogue is understood in the works of such educators 
as Ekkehard Martens (2000) and Gisela Raupach-Strey (2012) within 
the continental tradition, and Matthew Lipman (2003), Ann Sharp 
(1992) and Gareth Matthews (1984) within the analytic tradition. 
To safeguard against self-deception, Nelson (1949) elaborates, 
it is important that the dialogue is seen as a collective effort directed 
at the growth of philosophical comprehension. Clearly, in order to 
successfully implement this collective effort, participants need to 
carefully listen to each other. 
According to composer Philip Glass, “the problem with listening 
is, of course, that we don’t” (1999). Glass is specifically referring to 
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our internal environment, or the structure of our thinking as he 
conceives of it, which according to him is not conducive to listening. 
However, it seems that his diagnosis applies to our external 
environment just as much, even increasingly so, as evident by the 
rising amount of screens in both the private and the public sphere—
including schools. In other words, there is little doubt about the fact 
that we live in a predominantly visual culture. This is not to say that 
there is nothing to hear; we live in a very noisy culture as well. 
Hearing, however, is not the same as listening. An important 
difference is that listening in the context of a Socratic dialogue 
presupposes the acknowledgement of and engagement with what is 
being said—both pre-conditions for the co-creation of meaning as 
one of the central objectives of the Socratic endeavour. Even more 
rudimental, listening requires a certain willingness to acknowledge 
and engage in the first place. This is not essential to hearing as an 
act of passively registering sounds. 
Interestingly, pioneering facilitators of philosophical dialogues 
in Japan, (Kono, Murase, Terada & Tsuchiya, 2017), as one of the 
few, more or less directly stress the importance of listening with 
their slogan Slow Thinking. This means that participants should 
not rush to conclusions but instead examine questions, common 
sense notions, and their own assumptions. Participants of their 
community of inquiry therefore have three basic rights: 1) the right 
to ponder in silence, 2) the right not to talk when one does not want 
to, and 3) the right to say “I don’t know” when one does not know 
what to say at a particular moment in the dialogue. 
Would a facilitator of Socratic dialogues ignore the importance 
of listening inherent to the dialogic practice, participants would likely 
end up having an exchange of opinions that may seem very animated 
and engaging, but has little to do with practicing philosophy. After 
all, one of the differences between an exchange of opinions and a 
philosophical dialogue is that it is not strictly necessary to listen in 
an exchange of opinions; opinions are just opinions and one does 
not necessarily need to respond to other opinions; one can simply 
hear and accept that someone else has another opinion and move on. 
In everyday instances, this may not always be problematic but when 
striving for philosophical comprehension, not listening becomes an 
important impediment. 
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I therefore argue that listening is what makes a dialogue 
Socratic. Certainly, if no one is speaking then there is nothing to 
actually listen to. But in the context of a Socratic dialogue, speaking 
without listening seems tantamount to not speaking at all—precisely 
because listening is what precedes the co-creation of meaning. This 
is why I refer to listening as a pre-condition, not merely a condition. 
It is the first condition that has to be met in order for the process of 
co-creating meaning to unfold. 
Listening to music and the philosophy of 
dialogue 
In a response to our mechanical ways of socializing—which have 
become more mechanical than ever after the introduction of social 
media—Elias Canetti suggests that music may become an important 
source of philosophical life (as cited in: Fiumara, 1990). After all, 
“one does not need to draw on music for it is always within us; all 
we have to do is listen simply, otherwise we would learn in vain” (as 
cited in Fiumara, 1990, p. 78). 
When it comes to the distinction between listening and hearing 
in the educational Socratic dialogue, it is interesting to observe that 
meaningfully engaging with music also presupposes listening to 
it, not merely hearing it. Apart from the advantage of music as a 
source of philosophical life according to Canetti, another advantage 
of focusing on music in this case would be that it allows us to more 
or less isolate the variable listening as a skill to better understand 
and subsequently improve. After all, as opposed to participating 
in a philosophical dialogue, it is not necessary to speak in the 
literal sense when listening to music. Which does not mean that it 
is not necessary to respond at all to what is being heard, but this 
responding, or rather engaging, is only possible when a specific 
kind of listening has preceded it. This specific kind of listening is 
dialogic in nature. To explain what I mean by this, I discuss the 
basic principles of dialogic philosophy first. 
Philosophy of dialogue as a twentieth century discipline 
typically refers to “a reciprocal and interpersonal middle” (Ritter, 
1972, my translation), where meaning is co-created. As stated 
earlier, in ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages, dialogue primarily 
implies a literary form. There, it also refers to some kind of “speech 
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of the soul with itself” (Ritter, 1972, my translation). But it is not 
until the nineteenth century that the term dialogue is truly shaped. 
Where dialectics as a term related to communication is 
commonly understood as the art of conversing, dialogue refers to 
a process where subjective perspectives meet and evolve from the 
private, to the collective and general sphere. Ritter refers to this as 
an “Übergang zu einem höheren, den Rückblick ermöglichenden 
Standpunkt” (Ritter, 1972, p. 227). In other words, a move to a 
higher ground that enables (self-)reflection. This is the basis of all 
philosophical dialogue. 
In the early twentieth century a new group of (religious) 
philosophers of dialogue emerge independently of each other—e.g. 
Hermann Cohen, Ferdinand Ebner, Franz Rosenzweig—of whom 
Martin Buber, writer of Ich und Du in 1923, is arguably most 
famous. Indeed, according to Ritter (1972), Buber makes the most 
important phenomenological contribution to the understanding of 
the philosophy of dialogue, as a counterpart to Hegel’s systematic 
and transcendental philosophy. This kind of philosophy especially 
influenced theological and pedagogic traditions, which is why 
Buber’s most famous essay, Ich und Du, is more often found in the 
theology section of libraries and bookshops than in the philosophy 
section. According to his translator Walter Kaufmann, however, the 
book will survive the anticipated death of theology for it speaks to 
those whose primary concern is not at all with religion, but rather 
with social change; in this case educational change.
But why use religious terms at all? As Kaufmann notes, secular 
times call for “a new language, new poets to create it, and new ears 
to listen to it” (as cited in Buber, 1970, p. 31). Are we there yet, one 
wonders? In any case, Kaufmann eloquently states: “if we shut 
our ears to the old prophets who still speak more or less in the old 
tongues […]we shall have very little music” (p. 31). These prophets 
do not have to be religious in any sense. But as Kaufmann puts it, 
we cannot ignore past traditions if we want to arrive at this new 
language. 
In short, this new language consists of two relationships, 
singled out by Buber in Ich und Du: 1) I recognize It (Es) as an 
object, especially of experience and use, and 2) I respond with my 
whole being to You (1970). Interestingly, It can be human as well, 
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just as much as You can be non-human. This reminds of Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason (2015), where Kant argues to always 
treat humanity—in our own person as well as that of others—as an 
end also, and never only as a means. In Buber’s terminology, this is 
one way of setting off the I-You relation from the I-It. As soon as a 
relationship has run its course or is permeated by means, the You 
becomes an object among objects (Buber, 1970). I will come back to 
these relations by relating them to the practice of dialogic listening.
Dialogic listening
The term dialogic listening is relatively new and originated in 
communication science literature. Here, it is set off from empathic 
listening on the one hand, which revolves around trying to experience 
what is at the root of someone’s outward communication. In other 
words, when empathically listening, one attempts to deduce or 
guess the experience of the other’s internal state. Dialogic listening, 
however, concentrates on the meanings that are being mutually 
created, requiring for dialogic listening to move beyond empathy to 
a focus on an interpersonal middle (Stewart, Zediker & Witteborn, 
2012). Most relevant here is the meaning of dia as between. Based 
on these insights, and Buber’s philosophy, I now distinguish three 
interrelated features of dialogic listening in the context of Socratic 
dialogues. In the pursuit of meaningful engagement, these features 
relate to both the Socratic dialogue, and to the listener of music. 
The first is openness, or the dissolution of restraint and 
cultivation of a pre-reflexive attitude. A good example of this has 
already been offered by Nelson, who would label dogmatic thinking 
as a kind of restraint or as an impediment to the art of  “forcing 
minds to freedom”(Nelson, 1949, p. 29). In other words, dissolution 
of restraint may be understood as the dissolution of dogma: if one 
is only waiting to hear one’s biases being confirmed or attacked, 
one is not really listening in a dialogic sense. This is what happens 
in discussions or debates where people try to convince others of 
their own opinions or convictions; there is engagement, but no 
engagement in a philosophical sense, and therefore, no co-created 
meanings are arrived at. Dialogic listening presupposes a free and 
open kind of listening that is characterized by not restraining itself 
to any dogma and a willingness to cooperate. This is what allows for 
philosophical wonder.
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Listening to speech is often done in a way that the listener tries to 
simultaneously interpret what the speaker is saying. This, to a great 
extent, is inevitable and even crucial to participating in a dialogue 
but it also means that the listener is translating what she is hearing, 
allowing for (dogmatic) impurities to be introduced that may result 
in a kind of compromise between the listener and speaker. From 
a philosophical perspective, this is not desirable. Especially not 
when the listener is particularly dominant in her interpretation, as 
this closed way of listening hinders the dialogue to move to a more 
inquisitive, cooperative and thus philosophical ground. 
Here, music may prove to be especially helpful. When listening 
to music, one may learn to refrain from interpreting immediately 
and practice the cultivation of a greater kind of openness. What is 
especially helpful about music in this sense is that it does not allow 
for immediate and specific interpretations. Music is inherently 
abstract and does not communicate preconceived ideas in the way 
that speech does. Precisely this difference serves as an argument to 
turn to music for the practice of listening, instead of speech; music 
allows for more openness because it is not immediately interpretable 
in the same way a spoken phrase is. What is more, it does not even 
require to be interpreted in the first place, allowing for the cultivation 
of a pre-reflexive and non-dogmatic kind of listening. In one of 
his lectures discussing music as an example, Merleau-Ponty put it 
as follows: “All I have to do here is listen without soul-searching, 
ignoring my memories and feelings and indeed the composer of the 
work, to listen just as perception looks at the things themselves.” (as 
cited in Szyszkowska, 2018, p. 145). 
The second feature is reciprocity. The dialogic is a fundamental 
behavioural attitude that becomes active in relation to voice, 
including non-human voices. This is important, since it is precisely 
the feature that makes it possible to speak of dialogic listening in 
the context of music. Put differently, this suggests that a work of 
art can be a You as well. What is more, it should be recognized as a 
You if one is to enter into a dialogic relation with it, meaning that 
the work of art is not primarily an object to be put to use, or an 
object of experience: it is the voice of You speaking to me, requiring 
a response. (Buber, 1970) 
In both Socratic dialogue and in the case of music, the relation 
between I and You becomes reciprocal by allowing You to speak 
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through the effort of listening. Dialogic listening in this sense is an 
active and receptive quality by virtue of enabling the other to speak. 
In the case of another person this is more or less obvious but in the 
case of music, reciprocity amounts to an attitude of opening up to 
music in a way that it has something to tell, as opposed to something 
entertaining, or something to enjoy on the background. 
The third feature is awareness, or the process of becoming 
aware of the other. This refers to taking the other—whether a person 
or a work of art—in its totality as opposed to a set of abstractions. In 
the case of another person, one would fail to take a person as a whole 
when perceiving the other only as a member of a certain race, culture, 
gender, socio-economic background or political orientation, for 
example. This part of the cooperative effort starts with dialogically 
listening to the totality of the You as a voice requiring a response. 
(Buber, 1970)
This is true for music as well; whoever is only waiting for a 
certain Leitmotiv in a Wagner opera to return, or only listens to the 
percussive movement of Shostakovich’ seventh symphony is not 
really engaging with the piece of music as a whole. Nor is one who 
only listens to music that “adapts itself to the wishes of the listener”, 
as Elmer Schönberger put it in his lecture Het Grote Luisteren 
(2007).
In order to further understand this feature in the context of 
music, it is helpful to look at some of Gadamer’s ideas on aesthetics. 
In Truth and Method (2013), Gadamer argues against the principle 
of aesthetic differentiation (ästhetische Unterscheidung). This 
principle assumes that the aesthetic quality of a work of art should 
be distinguished from its content-specific properties. A piece of 
music, for example, is not judged on its aesthetic quality by looking 
at the notes that are written in the music sheet. In Buberian terms 
we would turn the music into an It that way, preventing us to engage 
in any sort of dialogic relation. 
Instead, Gadamer offers the principle of ästhetische 
Nichtunterscheidung, or aesthetic non-differentiation, which means 
that the aesthetic quality of a work of art cannot be isolated from 
the work itself (Gadamer, 2013). The work of art does not consist 
of properties or tones, in the case of music; it expresses something 
unique as a work of art in its totality and in its situatedness in the 
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world. This means that art never wholly speaks for itself; it always 
requires some sort of activity from the one engaging with it. What 
is more, the work of art does not exist outside of the aesthetic 
experience according to Gadamer; the identity of a work of art is 
established by engaging with it. In dialogic terms one may refer to 
this hermeneutic identity as the voice of art or the inner life of a 
composition whose meaning is not waiting to be discovered, but is 
co-constructed in a dialogic relation. 
The fact that there is something to be interpreted in the first 
place—and more importantly, that it wants to be interpreted—is what 
makes this identity hermeneutic. Put in Buberian terms, music speaks 
to us as a You to an I in its totality, not merely to an I as a concert 
visitor or a middle-class person with a certain cultural background, 
for example. Gadamer sees this quality as a demand from the work of 
art that is waiting to be redeemed. The work of art demands some kind 
of answer, which can only be provided by the I that relates to the work 
of art as a You—see previous feature. This is not a universal answer, 
but an answer given by the I that enters into a dialogue with the work 
of art. Again, the piece of music and its meaning are not embedded 
in the work itself, but in the relation with its listener—which explains 
why every You is different for every I. 
The same is true for the participants of the Socratic dialogue. 
Just as a piece of music does not consist of tones, a person does 
not consist of personal characteristics and properties. Both 
express something unique in their totality, which can only become 
meaningful in a dialogic process enabled by listening. 
Conclusion
According to Buber (1970), real dialogue has become a rarity. Most 
of what people do when conversing should be referred to more 
accurately as chatter—nowadays in the figurative and literal sense. 
Although it may seem so, people do not really engage in dialogue 
with each other by listening, but rather by (online) chatting and 
hearing. If this is true, and taking the isolating effects of social media 
into account (Twenge, 2017), Buber is more right than ever today.
The same applies to people’s engagement with music. Although 
there has never been more music in the private and public space, 
music in most cases has been degraded to the background and 
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more often than not, serves as a means to a—commercial—end. 
In addition, nowadays it seems to have become normal to wear 
earphones or headphones whilst chatting to other people. However, 
simultaneously hearing music and hearing other people talk causes 
us to hear a lot, but prevents us from listening to anything at all. 
These social problems revolving around listening are clearly 
not favourable to the quality of the Socratic dialogue. With the 
help of the cultivation of dialogic listening, however, this pattern of 
behaviour may change. Dialogic listening does not mean listening 
to as many people or as much music as possible. As a precondition 
for co-created meanings, it denotes an activity where 1) openness, 
2) reciprocity, and 3) awareness are of pivotal importance. Buber 
emphasizes repeatedly that the key to a dialogic relation is to treat 
the other—person or music—not as an object, but as a You, and as 
a consequence, a partner in life. It is true that this is sometimes 
difficult and requires an effort. What is more, listening “demands a 
strength and rigour that are difficult to subjugate and that deserve 
constant exercise” (Fiumara, 1990, p. 60). But it is an exercise 
and effort worth making, because it allows for meaningful and 
philosophical relations to both people and art. 
Although music does not require discursive interaction in the 
same way as the participant in a dialogue, it does require, or even 
demand, some sort of response in order to speak of a meaningful 
engagement. Music never wholly speaks for itself, nor does any 
given statement in a dialogue; in order for their voices to become 
potential contributors to the “sculpting of mutual meanings” 
(Stewart et al., 2012, p. 202), they both require a listening subject 
that engages with them dialogically. As De Munck (2014) put it, 
musical engagement should not be understood as the product or 
effect of the musical experience, nor as the content of music itself. 
Indeed, it is the meaningfulness of the musical engagement that is 
implied in the listening practice itself, just as the meaningfulness 
of the philosophical engagement is implied in the listening practice 
during a Socratic dialogue. 
Listening to music is not meant to be understood as a mere 
metaphor   for   the importance of listening here, but as a complementary 
opportunity to the philosophical educational practice. Although this 
paper is not conclusive in completing the argument that listening 
to music actually improves philosophical listening in educational 
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practices, it attempts to show that the metaphor is apt enough to 
suggest that it captures something essential in our thinking about 
the educational philosophical endeavour. Further research is needed 
to gain a more profound understanding of what it means to listen, 
and whether listening to music is dialogic enough to make the case 
for a more musical philosophical practice. One possibility to take 
further steps in this area involves embedding these questions in a 
phenomenological framework. After all, similar to the attitude that 
is sought after in the practice of philosophical dialogue, 
phenomenology is one attempt to step back from certain types of 
involvement with the world and direct our attention to specific 
features of our experience of the world. Herein lies the clue to the 
epoché and the direction of phenomenological description. (Ihde, 
2007, p. 204)
Indeed, the interest for concreteness of experience in 
phenomenology seems to make perfect sense for addressing 
questions within the philosophical educational practice.
Listening to music—following further scrutiny—may ultimately 
come to be understood as a philosophical activity to the extent 
that it allows for a dialogic practice, facilitating the process of new 
meaning, co-created between I—the listener—and You—the piece 
of music and interlocutor. Precisely this practice and longing for 
meaning is the point of departure in the true sense of philosophy. 
It is in this sense that listening to music may help us become better 
philosophers.
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